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GUNS AND JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: 
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE 
LAWRENCE SOUTHWICK, JR.* 
“. . . the victims are no doubt better than the wrongdoers, but are at the mercy 
of their inferiors in the field in which they themselves are inferior, where, that 
is, they cannot be classed among the good since they have not trained 
themselves in self-defense. . . . . .But at this stage some have not armed 
themselves-and the duly armed win the day.  Not even a God would have the 
right to deal a blow for the unwarlike: the law decrees that to come safe out of 
battle is for fighting men, not for those that pray.” Plotinus1 
1. Introduction 
Self-defense may be a more important part of the overall crime control 
effort than is popularly recognized.  In the mass media, it is usually assumed 
that crime fighting is the exclusive province of the criminal justice system; that 
is, the police, courts, and corrections organizations.  The citizen is relegated to 
providing information to the police and in court as well as occasionally acting 
as a juror.  It is often recommended by some authorities that the citizen should 
not resist the criminal attacker.2  It is argued that resistance will provoke the 
attacker into committing greater injury.3  It is also argued that the use of a 
weapon for self-defense, particularly a firearm, is likely to result in greater 
harm to the victim than would otherwise be the case.4  It is also argued that the 
weapon is likely to result in direct harm to the owner when there is no outside 
attack.5  For example, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence quotes A. 
Kellerman, “A gun in the home for self-protection is 43 times more likely to 
kill a family member or friend than to kill an intruder”.6 
 
         *  Associate Professor of Management Science at SUNY-Buffalo. 
 1. THE THIRD ENNEAD, GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, p. 86-87. 
 2. See, e.g., Yeager, M.G., J.D. Alviani, and N. Loving, “How Well Does the Handgun 
Protect You and Your Family” in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE (1990). 
 3. See Yeager (1990, p. 215). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 223. 
 6. Of course, this is a silly metric; the comparison should be between lives saved by 
defensive gun use and lives lost by defensive gun use.  It is as though one said that a person is 
much more likely to be injured by their airbag than is the drunk driver out there.  This is true, but 
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On the other hand, there are surveys which indicate that civilians use 
firearms for predominately self-defense purposes.  For example, Kleck and 
Gertz (1995) found that each year there are some “2.2 to 2.5 million defensive 
uses of guns of all types by civilians against humans”.7  Additionally Cook and 
Ludwig (1997) found that there were about 1.5 million defensive uses 
annually.8  These surveys are unable to tell us how successful these defenses 
are, what the effects would be if the defenders did not have guns for defense, 
or if the defenders are themselves criminals. 
The purpose of this study is to look at self-defense actions taken by police 
and by civilians to see if some inferences can be made about the number of 
times such actions are taken and how successful they are.  Of particular interest 
will be the numbers of justifiable homicides committed by police officers and 
by civilians and how many other cases of self defense can be inferred from 
these.  Lastly, statistical tests will be used to show the effect of gun purchases 
on changes in the crime rates, and see if any changes result. 
Potential crimes have several possible outcomes.  They may be deterred by 
the threat of sanctions imposed by the criminal justice 
(police/court/corrections) system.  They may be actually stopped from 
happening by police action, although this seldom happens.  They may be 
deterred by the threat of sanctions from civilians, particularly armed civilians.  
They may be stopped by actions taken by civilians, usually the victim.  Finally, 
the crime may be successfully completed.  These possibilities are shown in 
Figure 1.  The usual measurements of crime, although typically incomplete, 
include E. Completed Crimes, B. Stopped by Police, and some of D. Stopped 
by Civilians.  They cannot include deterred crimes, whether by police or 
civilians because those crimes are never attempted.  Deterrence, however, is 
the ideal result because it has the lowest social cost9.  This paper will attempt 
to quantify the amounts of civilian deterrence and civilian crime stopping. 
 
irrelevant.  The issue with airbags as well as with guns is whether your risk of being injured by 
the drunk driver or the criminal is reduced by more or less than your risk of being injured by your 
airbag or gun.  Further, as several researchers have pointed out, the Kellerman statement is 
incorrect as well because it refers to “friends” rather than acquaintances.  Many self-defense 
homicides are against acquaintances: non-strangers commit about half of all violent crimes.  In 
addition, Kellerman includes suicides. 
 7. Kleck G., and M. Gertz, “Armed Resistence to Crime: The Prevelance and Nature of 
Self-Defense With a Gun” in JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, v. 86(1), p. 164 
(1995). 
 8. Cook. P.J., and J. Ludwig, “Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership 
and Use of Firearms” in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF, May 1997. 
 9. This does not include the cost of protection which should be factored in to any total cost 
function. 
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2. Justifiable Homicides and Disincentives For Crime 
Over the five year period, 1993-1996, the police committed justifiable 
homicide an average of 398 times per year.10  During the same period, the 
civilian public committed justifiable homicide an average of 299 times per 
year.11  This latter figure may be lower than the true number if the FBI is 
unable to obtain the final outcomes of cases initially incorrectly categorized as 
unjustified.  There were an average of 262.8 million people in the country12 
and 581,496 sworn police13 during these same years. 
The data for justifiable homicide are shown in Table 1.14  As can be seen 
from the first row, the police are more than 8 times more likely to kill a felon 
than is the criminal justice system to execute him after arrest.  If we add in the 
risk from citizens, the result is that executions are only about 7 percent as 
frequent as are justifiable homicides; executions averaged 49 per year while 
justifiable homicides averaged 697.  Most of these justifiable homicides were 
 
 10. FBI STATISTICS, <http://www.fbi.gov/pressr./pressrel/98archives.1997rel.htm>. 
 11. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.fbi.gov./ucr/Cius_97/95Crimes6.pdf>. 
 12. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.census.gov.statab/ 
.www/.>. 
 13. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.fbi.gov./ucr/Cius_97/95Crimes6.pdf>. 
 14. See for example, <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/> for statistics from various years. 
Figure 1 





A. Deterred by Police/Courts/Corrections 
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accomplished with guns, particularly handguns.  The percentages with guns 
were 100 for police and 88 for civilians.  Handguns were 89 percent for police 





    
Total Police Civilians Executions 
Number 398.2 298.8 48.8 
    
Using Guns 398.2 262.4  
Percent Guns 100% 88%  
    
Handguns 353.0 213.4  
Percent Handguns 89% 71%  
    
    
*Data from Crime in the United States, various issues. 
 
The term “justifiable homicide” is defined to mean the killing of a felon by 
a law enforcement officer in the line of duty or the killing by a civilian of a 
felon during the commission of a felony.15  There is a tendency, as indicated in 
these definitions, to give wider latitude to the police than to civilians to commit 
homicide.  Of course, this depends on each state’s laws. 
From an initial look at these data it would seem that the risk of death at the 
hands of either the police or civilians would be of obvious concern to felons.  It 
is evident that executions provide a disincentive to commit murder, as found 
by Ehrlich (1975)16 who found that each execution deterred approximately 
seven to eight murders.  Of course, justifiable homicides by police and by 
civilians are not solely in response to murder but are the result of attempts to 
commit murder either directly or in the course of committing other crimes.  
However, if each execution and each justifiable homicide results in 7.5 fewer 
murders, the total of 697 justifiable homicides each year should have deterred 
over 5,200 murders each year.  Compared with the approximately 21,500 
 
 15. See for example, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, p. 22. 
 16. Ehrlich, I., “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,” 
in THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, v. LXV(3), p. 398 (1975).  Brumm and Cloninger more 
recently found support for this hypothesis.  See Brumm, H.J., and D.O. Cloninger, “Perceived 
risk of punishment and the commission of homicides: A covariance structure analysis,” in 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, v. 31 (1996). 
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murders actually occurring each year as shown in Table 2,17 this implies that 
the murder rate would have been about 24 percent higher without these 
justifiable homicides.  The civilian justifiable homicides averaged 299 per 




Crime FBI Data NCVS Data NCVS/FBI  
Murder 21,464  NA NA  
Rape 99,614   138,786 1.393  
Robbery   586,263 1,167,722 1.992  
Aggravated Assault   1,081,702 2,176,760 2.012  
Total Violent   1,789,042 3,483,268 1.947  
     
Burglary   2,620,804 5,261,455 2.008  
*Data from Crime in the United States, various issues, from 
Criminal Victimization 1997, Changes 1996-97, Dec. 1998, 
and from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, various issues. 
 
Kleck (1991, pages 112-116 and Table 4.3) argues that civilian legal 
defensive homicides using guns are actually between four times the FBI count 
and 7.4 times the FBI count because the FBI does not later change initial 
incorrect categorizations of unjustifiable to justifiable.18  He compared the FBI 
data with local police counts in several cities to find those levels of 
underestimates.19  If we use the lower Kleck figure of 4, that would imply, 
using the Ehrlich 7.5 times incentive effect, that civilian justified homicides 
result in a reduction of more than 8,900 murders per year.  In this case, without 
those civilian justified homicides, the murder rate would have been more than 
41 percent higher. 
Of course, the above argument relies on some very strong inferences which 
may not be valid.  The situations which result in murders leading to executions 
may well differ from those which result in justifiable homicides.  The police 
are likely to encounter felons during an attempt to make an arrest.  The police 
will only be compelled to commit justifiable homicide if they are threatened 
with life threatening actions by the felon who thy are arresting.  Civilians 
encounter such situations generally during the commission of a felony in 
 
 17. FBI STATISTICS, <http://www.fbi.gov/pressr./pressrel/98archives.1997rel.htm>, CRIME 
IN THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.fbi.gov./ucr/Cius_97/95Crimes6.pdf>, and STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, <http://www.census.gov.statab/.www/.>. 
 18. Kleck, G., POINT BLANK, GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA p. 112-116 and Table 4.3 
(1991). 
 19. See Kleck (1991, p. 112-116 and Table 4.3). 
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circumstances in which a reasonable person would feel threatened with serious 
harm.  In order to infer that many murders are deterred, it would need to be 
reasoned that the felon would understand the risk of such consequences and 
would modify his behavior accordingly so as to reduce the risk of being killed.  
That is, the felon would not attack the police who are trying to arrest him, or 
would moderate any attack on civilians to reduce the probability they would be 
able to justify killing him.  Of course, one way to reduce both risks is to avoid 
crimes which lead to such outcomes.  That is, the criminal could choose less 
risky crimes or choose to commit fewer crimes. 
Continuing with this potential incentive, the ratio of other violent crimes to 
murders is about 82 to 1, based on FBI data.  These are shown in Table 2.  
However, based on the (NCVS) survey data also shown in Table 2, the ratio is 
more like 162 to 1.  If we assume that violent crimes other than murder are 
reduced by the risk of justifiable homicide in the same proportion they bear to 
murders, again due to this incentive effect, this implies that the risk of 
justifiable homicide from police and civilians for the criminal results in 
somewhere between 430,000 and 840,000 fewer violent crimes than would 
otherwise be perpetrated.  However, using Kleck’s lower bound numbers for 
justifiable homicides would imply a reduction of from 1,700,000 to 3,300,000 
violent crimes. 
Out of the average of 697 reported justifiable homicides each year, there 
were guns used in 660 cases.20  This is over 94 percent of all justifiable 
homicides and indicates that many of these justifiable homicides would not 
have been possible without the guns being available to the police or to the 
victims.  The police used guns all of the times while civilians used guns 88 
percent of the times.  Assuming that absent the civilian guns, the civilian 
justifiable homicides committed with guns would not have occurred, this can 
be used to infer that there would have been from 2,000 to 7,900 more murders 
per year and from 160,000 to 320,000 (or 640,000 to 1,300,000, using Kleck’s 
lower bound estimates of justifiable homicides) more other violent crimes per 
year due to the lack of the negative incentive for the criminals. 
The above is based on the single estimate of 7.5 murders deterred per 
execution by Ehrlich.  It is worth considering the fact that executions averaged 
75 per year during the period studied by Ehrlich.  With only about two-thirds 
as many each year in a more recent period, it would seem reasonable that the 
marginal product would be higher.  That is, each execution should be more 
effective now than during the time studied by Ehrlich.  The risk to a murderer 
of being executed was then about 0.008 (1 in 125) and has now dropped to 
about 0.002 (1 in 500).  Therefore, the above estimates of the incentive effects 
of justifiable homicides may be biased downward; the true effect could well be 
 
 20. See Table 1. 
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much larger.  The average effect should also be larger, assuming a declining 
marginal product.21 
Cloninger (1991) found that lethal responses by police were associated 
with a reduced crime rate.22  It would seem likely that lethal civilian responses 
would have the same effect.  His elasticity was (negative) one-sixth23 which, 
given the data here, implies that each incremental lethal response would reduce 
the number of violent crimes by 1,350.  This is a somewhat larger effect than 
computed above; if there is a constant marginal effect, violent crimes are 
reduced by about 400,000 annually by civilians killing felons, including about 
a 350,000 reduction in violent crimes due to civilian killings with guns owned 
by felons, or, if we use Kleck’s numbers, there is a 1,400,000 reduction. 
Using Ehrlich’s figure and Cloninger’s figure these results are quite close 
to each other in terms of the incentive not to commit crimes.  It is also 
consistent with estimates of crime reduced through self-defense with guns as 
given by various surveys.  There are two ways for crimes to be deterred.  First, 
if the risk is too great, the criminal does not undertake to commit the crime in 
the first place.  Second, the potential victim, through being armed and showing 
this fact to the attacker, causes the attacker to desist.  Thus, the overlap of 
crimes deterred with the use of guns in self-defense does exist, but the two 
categories are not the same.  The latter is more properly considered as stopping 
the crime. 
3. Inferences About Civilian Arms 
As mentioned above, if is often recommended to civilians that they leave 
their defense to the police and not attempt to engage in self-defense against 
criminals.24  However, the fact that civilians kill an average of 299 felons per 
year, 88 percent with guns, while police kill 398 felons per year with guns, 
implies that civilians are having a substantial portion of the effect police have.  
If Kleck’s estimates are correct, civilians have a much greater effect than do 
the police.  There are fewer police than there are civilians but a greater portion 
of the police carry firearms.  It would appear that these two factors are offset 
with respect to the number of felons killed, a measure of the risk to a felon. 
This section takes a look at the relative risks faced by the felon who attacks 
police compared with attacking civilians.  The circumstances may well differ 
in the interactions, but the issue of risk remains the same in both cases. 
 
 21. The rate of police justified homicides is about the same as the rate of deaths through 
“police intervention”, an earlier series.  Thus, the overall official rate of killing felons has fallen. 
 22. Cloninger, D.O., “Lethal Police Response as a Crime Deterrent”, in AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, v. 50(1) p. 59-69 (1991). 
 23. See Cloninger (1991). 
 24. Lott, J.R. Jr., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL 
LAWS, p. 13 (1998a).  As Lott notes, the police are normally unable to protect civilians and 
usually react after a crime is committed. 
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It is usually the case that a person who attacks police officers knows that 
they are armed because uniformed police generally carry their arms in an 
unconcealed fashion.  That is not the case with civilians who, if they are 
armed, are usually carrying their weapons concealed rather than openly.  The 
attacker knows the risk of attacking police involves the use by the police of 
their guns, while the attacker of a civilian has an unknown probability of 
encountering an armed victim, since the probability of a civilian being armed is 
much lower than the probability of the police officer being armed. 
The police will usually encounter felons as the result of a police attempt to 
arrest the felons.  The original crimes for which they are to be arrested have 
already been committed and the police attempt to arrest the perpetrators after 
the fact.  The civilian is most likely to encounter a felon during the commission 
of the felonious act.  The civilian is generally surprised by the felon as opposed 
to the police officer who expects to be dealing with a felon.  The result is that 
the civilian is less likely to be prepared to deal with the felon than is the police 
officer. 
The number of individuals who are killed by the police or by civilians in 
such justifiable homicides can be computed as the result of a probabilistic 
process.  Take the number of encounters some group has with felons.  We will 
use the groups of police and civilians.  Multiply the number in each group by 
the probability that the person who has the encounter with a felon is armed.  
Then multiply the result by the probability that the person having the encounter 
needs to and is able to use his/her firearm.  Multiply that result by the 
probability that the person who is able to use the gun actually fires the gun.  
Multiply that result by the probability that the person who fires actually hits the 
felon.  Finally, multiply that result by the probability that the felon who is hit 
actually dies.  The result will be the number of felons killed by either group, 
police or civilians. 
Using algebraic symbols, let the number in the group be Ni where i is 
either police or civilians.  The probability of an encounter where deadly force 
is appropriately used is Ei; thus the number of encounters is Ni Ei.  The 
probability of a person being armed, given an encounter, is Ai.  The probability 
of the armed person being able to use the firearm is Ui.  The probability of 
firing the gun, given the capability of use, is Fi.  The probability of hitting the 
felon upon firing is Hi.  The probability of death for the felon who is hit is Di.  
The number of felons who die as the result of being shot by the police or 
civilians is Mi.  The identity is thus: (1) 
Mi = Ni Ei Ai Ui Fi Hi Di  
for each of the two groups, police and civilians. 
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Next, consider the ratio of the equations for the two groups.  It doesn’t 
matter which group is in the numerator, but let us place the police there.  The 
result is:(2) 
Mp = Np Ep Ap Up Fp Hp Dp 
Mc  Nc Ec Ac Uc Fc Hc Dc 
Now, consider the ratios of these numbers and probabilities, one at a time. 
The number of felons who are in contact with the police in an adversarial 
relationship, Np Ep,  is related to the number of arrests made by the police on 
felony charges.  Some of those arrested will be found not guilty of the crime 
with which they are charged and others will have some or all of the charges 
dropped due to lack of evidence.  In 1994, there were 808,647 arrests for 
murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.25 
That same year, there were only 145,961 convictions for those four violent 
crimes.26  That is only about an 18.1 percent conviction rate and it might seem 
that police making most of the arrests are not risking violent confrontations.  
(Of course, the convictions are later than the arrests and may even be in a later 
year, but the numbers do not vary enough from year to year to suggest a 
greater conviction rate.) It is nevertheless probable that a substantial majority 
of the arrests are of people who have a violent background.  That is often the 
reason the individual is a suspect in a case; in the past, there has been evidence 
of a tendency to commit such crimes.  Consequently, it may be expected that 
the police are encountering violent persons each time they make an arrest for a 
violent crime.  Of course, there are other encounters where an arrest is not 
made; the suspect escapes after the encounter.  That would increase the 
confrontation numbers by an unknown amount. 
Over the 5 years 1993-1997, as shown in Table 3,27 there were an average 
of 783,202 arrests made for the four violent crimes indicated.  In each case, 
police encountered a person who was believed to be violent and, in most cases, 
had an actual violent past.  These represent the chances for violent 
confrontation between police and felons, which could result in justifiable 
homicides. 
 
 25. Table 4.1 in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1995). 
 26. Table 5.45 in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1997). 
 27. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1997), CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES, <http://www.fbi.gov./ucr/Cius_97/95Crimes6.pdf>, and STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, <http://www.census.gov.statab/.www/.>. 
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Table 3 
Arrests for Violent Crime 
        
 Murder Rape Robbery Agg. Ass. Violent  Violent 
 Arrest Arrest Arrest Arrest Arrest  Crime 
Year Rates* Rates* Rates* Rates* Rates Pop.^ Arrests 
1993 9.5 15.2 71.7 206.5 302.9 257,800 780,876 
1994 8.9 14.3 70.8 216.6 310.6 260,350 808,647 
1995 8.5 13.5 70.2 223.0 315.2 262,755 828,204 
1996 7.6 12.8 64.1 204.1 288.6 265,179 765,307 
1997 7.0 12.1 51.3 203.2 273.6 267,901 732,977 
        
Average 8.3 13.58 65.62 210.68 298.18 262,797 783,202 
        
* Sources: Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1997 and Crime in the U.S. 
1997. 
^ Sources: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1998 and Census Bureau Web. 
 
Citizens encounter felons when they are attacked.  The typical attack is a 
rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.  Murders are in lesser numbers but are 
included here even though the victim did not successfully fight off the attacker 
because some intended murder victims may have successfully done so; 
certainly there was an attack.  As shown in Table 2, these have averaged 
1,789,042 over the 5 years from 1993-1997.  However, if we use the values 
from the National Crime Victimization Surveys (NCVS), also shown in  Table 
2, the average is 3,483,268 violent crimes annually over the same 5 years.28  
Whichever is chosen, this is the value Nc Ec. 
It could be argued that burglaries should be counted along with violent 
crimes, inasmuch as burglars are sometimes surprised by the property owner.  
The normal intent of a burglar is to enter unoccupied premises and to make off 
with valuable property without encountering the owner of the property.  
Wright and Rossi (1986, p. 145) found that 74 percent of criminals agreed with 
the statement, “One reason burglars avoid houses when people are at home is 
that they fear being shot during the crime.”29  The result is that most burglaries 
do not result in personal encounters between the burglar and the victim.  Some 
 
 28. The NCVS was revised in 1992 so that the data from earlier periods are not strictly 
comparable.  The later numbers are larger due to better responses.  This, of course, indicates that 
the latest NCVS data are probably still too low. 
 29. Wright, J.D., and P.H. Rossi, ARMED AND DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND 
THEIR FIREARMS, p. 145 (1986). 
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burglaries do result in such encounters, however, and probably should be 
counted.  Because the number is unknown and because there was no intent on 
the part of the burglar to have an encounter, these are not counted here.  It is 
noteworthy that England has essentially outlawed most private possession of 
guns and has a philosophy that self-defense is not a valid reason for shooting 
an assailant.30  Possibly because of those factors, there is a much higher rate of 
burglary of occupied homes in England than there is in the United States.31 
The ratio of the average number of felony arrests to the average number of 
violent crimes is 0.4378.  Thus, it is inferred that the ratio of the number of 
encounters with violent felons by police to encounters with violent felons by 
civilians, Np Ep/Nc Ec, is 0.4378.  If we use the NCVS data, adding in murders, 
the ratio is 0.2235. 
The next ratio in equation (2) is that of the relative probabilities of being 
armed, Ap/Ac.  It is normal for the police to carry guns.  This would be 
especially true when they are attempting to make arrests.  Consequently, the 
probability for police approaches 1.0.  For the private citizen, the probability is 
certainly much lower.  It is not, however, equal to the fraction of citizens who 
carry guns.  For that to be the case, all civilians would have to be subject to the 
same probability of being attacked.  That is not the case.  Some people are at 
much greater risk of attack such as people who live in poorer sections of cities, 
minorities, and people who themselves are operating outside the law.  At this 
point, let us leave this ratio to be determined later. 
The next ratio is of the ability to use the gun, Up/Uc.  For at least three 
major reasons, the police should be more readily able to use their guns.  First, 
they are generally better trained in the use of the gun and probably have 
practiced more in shooting it.  Second, their guns are usually more readily 
available since they have no need to conceal their firearms which are therefore 
probably carried in a more convenient position.  Third, the initiative is with the 
police because they have probably confronted the person to be arrested, as 
opposed to the civilian, who when confronted with a felon is usually surprised.  
Despite all of these factors, let us presume that the probabilities are equal; the 
ratio is one.  This assumption is for simplicity only and will be later relaxed. 
The next ratio is of the probabilities of firing the gun.  It seems at first 
more likely that the police will fire their guns than that the civilian will.  First, 
there is the issue of “buck fever” which is the psychological inability to pull 
the trigger when it is called for.  This phenomenon also afflicts soldiers, many 
of whom do not fire even in the heat of a battle.  It could well affect police, but 
their training would be expected to reduce this.  Another reason for civilians 
 
 30. Cf. Kopel (1994, p. 154). 
 31. See Kleck (1991, p. 139-40), and Lott (1998a, p. 5).  Also, this is reported in Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Crime and Justice in the United States and England and Wales, 1981-1996, on 
the BJS website (visited Dec. 17, 1998). 
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not firing their guns could be that the felon who is attacking them will often 
retreat when he sees that the intended victim is armed.  When the police are 
making an arrest, the felon is less likely to be able to retreat. 
The law typically permits the use of deadly physical force only where a 
person has reason to believe that he or she or another person is in imminent 
physical danger from the attacker.32  If the felon retreats from the show of 
force represented by the drawn gun, it would be illegal to fire the weapon.  The 
police, while theoretically held to the same standard, would know the law more 
precisely than the average citizen and might be willing to fire in more 
borderline circumstances than would the civilian.  All of these factors would 
seem to increase the ratio of the police firing probability to the civilian firing 
probability. 
On the other hand, the police are possibly more familiar with 
confrontations with felons than are civilians.  After all, that is a substantial part 
of their job.  The civilian would seem to be much less likely to have experience 
in doing so.  As a result, the civilian might well fire when the professional 
police officer would know that it is not necessary. 
The effect of either factor is reduced when it is realized that some civilian 
victims of felons are themselves criminals; there is a good deal of predation by 
criminals on other criminals.  For example, drug dealers have both cash and 
valuable drugs; they are a potential target for other criminals and could well be 
expected to arm themselves in response.  Because they cannot look to the civil 
authorities either for protection or for contract enforcement, they need the 
means for both in order to ensure their own safety and business success.  They 
have every incentive to learn how to shoot.  Further, they are more likely to be 
less reluctant than the police to actually fire their weapons. 
Though the overall effects of these factors is unknown; the assumption will 
be made at this point that the police and the civilians will have the same 
probability of actually firing their guns given that they have gained access to 
them under combat conditions. 
The next issue is the relative probability of police and civilians hitting their 
targets.  Police are generally better trained and should be better marksmen than 
the average civilian.  However, there is no reason to expect that persons who 
are capable of drawing their guns and firing them would be less trained; they 
are a select subset of the population who have chosen to be armed.  It would 
seem reasonable that they would have practiced just as the police would have.  
Kleck (1991) reports that attackers (the criminals) hit their victims in only 19 
percent of cases while New York City police hit their intended targets in 39 
percent of intended shootings.33  This represents only one study for the police 
 
 32. This represents a movement away from prior laws which allowed the shooting of a thief 
to a position where only a “reasonable” threat can justify shooting. 
 33. See Kleck (1991, p. 163). 
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and the rate of hits for attackers may well differ from the hit rate for defenders.  
Further, we don’t know whether the shooting by attackers was for the purpose 
of injuring the victim or as part of an intimidation process where the aim was 
deliberately away from the victim and the firing was simply effectively a threat 
done to gain compliance with the attacker’s demands.  Keep in mind that this 
probability of hitting the target is only for those who fire their guns.  As a 
working assumption on this question, assume that the rate of hitting the 
intended target is the same for police as for civilians. 
The next ratio is of the probabilities of those felons who are hit and then 
die from their injuries.  There is no reason to expect a difference between the 
police and the civilians on this issue.  Both are shooting with the intention of 
stopping the felon and are probably aiming at the trunk area of the body 
because that is both the largest target and usually the most effective place to 
hit.  If body armor is worn by the felon, a head shot generally would be more 
effective, but that is a smaller target and more difficult to hit.  It is only in 
fiction or accidents that the police shoot the hand or the leg of the felon.  To 
the extent that civilians have poorer marksmanship, their shots are likely to 
spread out more and therefore may be less likely to be fatal.  On the other side, 
the police have better communications facilities and can call for medical 
assistance more quickly after shooting a felon than can a civilian on the 
average.  The result would be that more rapid medical care may save more of 
the felons shot by police than of those who are shot by civilians.  However, it 
will be assumed that the probabilities of fatal injury are equal. 
Finally, look at the ratio of the felons killed by police using guns and by 
civilians using guns.  Over the 5 years from 1993 through 1997, that ratio 
averaged 1.5175.  If the Kleck reasoning is used, however, the ratio drops to 
about 0.38. 
We can now use the above assumptions and computed figures to find that 
the proportion of civilians who are armed when they are attacked by felons has 
averaged 28.9 percent if the FBI data are used.  From equation (2), the 
arithmetic is: 
1.5175 = (0.4378) (1/X) (1) (1) (1) 
where X is the percentage of civilians armed when they are attacked.  If the 
NCVS data are used, the proportion of armed civilians is 14.7 percent.  From 
equation (2), 
1.5175 = (0.2235) (1/X) (1) (1) (1). 
This does not imply that either 14.7 percent or 28.9 percent of civilians are 
armed at any point in time.  (The Kleck reasoning would imply even higher 
numbers of 40 percent and up).  The choice to be armed is likely to depend on 
the perceived risk of being attacked by a felon.  Using the National Crime 
Victimization Study data for 1979-1987, I have elsewhere found (Southwick, 
1995) that there is a strong positive correlation between the likelihood that an 
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attacker is armed and the likelihood that the victim is armed.34  People are 
more likely to arm themselves if they believe there is a high likelihood they 
will be attacked or if they have valuables to protect.35  There are costs to being 
armed and the benefits are higher in either of those cases so it makes more 
sense on a benefit/cost basis.  Kleck and Gertz (1998) reported that about 1.5 
percent of all adults are carrying at an average time on their persons and twice 
that percent carry in their vehicles.  That is consistent with the higher percent 
armed when attacked since the choices are interrelated. 
It should also be noted that some victims are not quite the innocents it 
might be thought.  Criminals reported that they fired their guns upwards of 25 
percent more often in self-defense than they did in the course of a crime.36  Of 
course, their perception of self-defense may differ from the legal definition.  
They may well be engaged in an illegal activity and self-defense may mean 
protection against anybody who would interfere with that activity.  The 
National Crime Victimization Study does not ask whether the victim was or 
was not a criminal, only whether he or she was attacked by someone else.  The 
initiative is the decision point for the categorization.37 
Let us suppose that one or another of the probability ratios is not of the 
magnitude assumed.  Then, the result will differ from the 15 or 28 percent 
armed victims derived above.  First, consider the ratio of the ability to use a 
firearm, given that the police officer or victim is armed.  It was assumed that 
these were equal.  However, suppose that the police have a probability 20 
percent higher than the civilians.  Next is the ratio of the probabilities of 
actually firing the gun at the felon.  It was assumed that the police and the 
civilians had the same ratio.  This, however, was argued as conservative.  
Suppose the police have a 20 percent greater probability of firing.  Finally, 
there is the ratio of the probabilities of hitting the felon.  It was argued that the 
police should be expected to be better shots and would therefore be more likely 
to hit their targets.  Despite this, it was assumed that the probabilities are equal.  
Suppose that the police actually have a 20 percent greater chance of hitting 
their target.  Compounding all of these changes which all act in the same 
direction means that it would then be inferred that somewhere between 20 and 
50 percent of civilians attacked by felons are themselves armed. 
Let us suppose that even the NCVS figures are low.  The reasons for which 
crime victims may not want to report crimes to the police may still apply when 
reporting the same information to another government employee.  The leading 
reasons for not reporting violent crimes to police were: it was a private matter, 
 
 34. Southwick, L. Jr., SELF-DEFENSE WITH GUNS: THE CONSEQUENCES, Presented at the 
Western Economic Association National Conference, San Diego, CA (June 1995). 
 35. See Kleck and Gertz (1995, p. 164). 
 36. See Wright and Rossi (1986, p. 86). 
 37. See Kleck (1991, p. 108-9). 
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the offender was unsuccessful, it was reported to some other official, it wasn’t 
important enough, police don’t want to be bothered, police are ineffective, fear 
of reprisal, lack of evidence, and inconvenience.38  Of course, it would not be 
likely to be reported to the questioner if the victim had been acting illegally as 
well. 
Make the presumption that there are one-third of the crimes which are not 
even reported to the surveyor in the NCVS, for whatever reasons may apply; 
several of the reasons listed above would lead the victim not to give the 
information to the NCVS any more than to the police.  The result would be that 
we would infer a probability of a victim’s being armed with a firearm from 10 
percent to 13 percent. 
These figures are consistent with a Roper survey discussed by Kleck 
(1991) which had about 5 percent of adults in the U.S. regularly carrying guns 
for self-defense.39  Wright (1984) reports on another survey which found that 7 
percent carry guns at least some of the time.40  A Los Angeles Times poll found 
that 11 percent carry guns at least some of the time for self-defense.41  Those 
people with the highest probabilities of being attacked are the most likely to 
carry guns for self-defense since they have the most to gain.  A person with a 
low probability of being attacked will have little value to carrying a gun for 
defense since he will have a very low probability of using it.  The person with 
a great probability of being attacked will have a higher value for a gun and will 
be more likely to choose to carry one.  Thus, a probability of 10 to 17 percent 
for a crime victim having a gun for defense appears realistic.42 
4. Risks To Criminals of Armed Civilians 
As a next step, let us see if we can fill in some of the values in equation (1) 
for both the police and civilians.  Of course, we already have good 
approximations for the numbers on each end of the equation, Mi and NiEi.  The 
former is the number of felons killed and the latter is the number of encounters 
with felons which could lead to conflict. 
Now, consider the value for Di .  This is the probability that the felon who 
is wounded by a bullet will die from that wound.  As discussed earlier, it is 
likely to be about the same for police as for civilians.  Cook (1985) 
summarizes several earlier studies to arrive at a figure of about 15 percent.43  
One of the comparisons he uses is the rate at which police who are injured by 
 
 38. Cf. Table 3, 34 in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1996. 
 39. See Kleck (1991, p. 118). 
 40. Wright, J.D., “The Ownership of Firearms for Reasons of Self-Defense,” in FIREARMS 
AND VIOLENCE, ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, p. 321 (1984). 
 41. Table 2.67 in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1994). 
 42. See Table 4.1 in Kleck (1991), for additional surveys. 
 43. Cook, P.J., “The Case of the Missing Victims: Gunshot Woundings in the National 
Crime Survey,” JOURNAL OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY, v. 1, p. 1 (1985). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
232 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:217 
gun using attackers die.  These data are from the years 1978-1982.  If we use 
more recent data on police injuries from firearms, as shown in Table 4, from 
1993-1997, the average death rate from wounds is 10.6 percent.44  As Cook 
notes, some of the injuries are from the use of the gun as a club rather than 
from firing the gun, so this will understate the true probability of death.45  It 
seems reasonable that more rapid responses to injuries in recent years as well 





     
 Firearm    
Year Assaults Injury Death Death/Injury 
1993 4,002 27.4% 67 6.1% 
1994 3,168 26.3% 78 9.4% 
1995 2,238 15.2% 62 18.2% 
1996 1,887 24.9% 51 10.9% 
1997 1,844 15.1% 62 22.3% 
     
Total 13,139 23.0% 320 10.6% 
     
*Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted, (FBI) various years. 
 
Suppose that the recent death rate from firearm woundings has fallen to 12 
percent from Cook’s 15 percent.  This would seem plausible, given the above 
results.  From that and the fact that civilians used guns to kill some 262 felons 
in the average year from 1993-1997, we would infer that civilians wounded 
some 2,183 felons in the average year.  Keep in mind that Kleck estimates 
 
 44. FBI, “Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 1996” (visted Nov. 2, 1999) 
<http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucreports.htm>; FBI NATIONAL PRESS OFFICE, “Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed and Assaulted 1997” (visited Nov. 2, 1999) <http://www.fbi.gov.pressrm/pressrel 
/98archives/1997rel.htm>.; Note that the police deaths from firearms comprise about 92 percent 
of all felonious police killings. 
 45. See Cook (1985, p. 95). 
 46. Southwick, L. Jr., “An Economic Analysis of Murder and Accident Risks for Police in 
the United States,” in APPLIED ECONOMICS, v. 30, p. 593-605 (1998); It is interesting that the risk 
of being murdered is actually lower for police than for civilians of the same age and sex in the 
U.S. 
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figures that are from 4 to 7.4 times as high which would increase these 
numbers by that factor or 8,700 to 16,100 wounded felons. 
Next, we need to consider the marksmanship of the civilians.  When 
shooting with intention to hit the felon, what is the probability that the shot will 
hit the target? One would expect that police would be better marksmen.  
However, civilians who carry firearms may well have a higher expectation of 
being attacked than do other people.  As a result, they would desire to be 
prepared for such an attack.  Preparation may well involve practice shooting 
and, therefore, when these people are attacked, they may shoot fairly well. 
Kleck (1991) states that “NCS [National Crime Victimization Survey] data 
covering the United States from 1979 to 1987 indicates that only 19% of 
incidents where an attacker shot at a victim resulted in the victim being hit.”47  
However, this almost certainly overstates the proportion of gunshots which hit 
the victim.  According to the NCVS, over half of all violent crimes are not 
reported to the police.48  One of the reasons often given was that the attacker 
was unsuccessful or did not harm the victim.49  There are undoubtedly 
numerous cases where the crime is not reported either to the police or to the 
NCVS even though the respondent knows that a crime was committed.  For 
example, the victim may have been engaged in an illegal activity as well.  The 
likelihood of reporting a crime is a function of whether the victim is harmed; 
this will also hold true for the NCVS responses.  Therefore the probability of an 
attacker who shoots at a victim, and actually hits the victim, is much lower 
than 19 percent.  On the other hand, the report is made by the victim who may 
believe that the shot was intended to hit him when the actual intention was to 
frighten or distract him. 
Returning to Table 4, the assaults on police using a firearm resulted in 
injury 23 percent of the time.  Of course, some of these involve using the 
firearm as a blunt instrument rather than firing it; most probably do not50.  
Many of these assaults are deliberate and are planned, so the hit rate should be 
higher than for the civilian who is fighting off an attacker. 
If we assume that the victim’s probability of hitting the target is equal to 
the attacker’s probability of hitting the victim, that implies that a gunshot 
aimed at the attacker will hit that attacker only about 10 to 20 percent of the 
time.  If it does not hit the attacker, it is very likely to frighten him away which 
is usually the desire of the victim.  Assuming a 15 percent hit rate implies that 
victims shot at attackers 14,550 times each year.  It would be closer to 59,000 
times if Kleck’s estimate of four times the number of civilian justifiable 
homicides is correct. 
 
 47. See Kleck (1991, p. 163). 
 48. See Tables 3.34 and 3.35 in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Statistics (1997). 
 49. Cf. Table 3.40 in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1995). 
 50. Cook (1985) estimates that 85 percent of police injuries from guns are bullet wounds. 
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Next, let us posit the percentage of those who are able to shoot who do, in 
fact, shoot at their assailants.  In most cases, the simple display of the firearm 
by the defender will be sufficient to ward off the attack.  In Table 5, the 
proportion of violent crimes which are committed by persons with guns is 
computed at an average of about 28 percent.  That implies that 72 percent of 
attackers are not using guns.  Almost all of that 72 percent will be deterred by 
the sight of a gun, even without its being fired.  Further, a good fraction of the 
other 28 percent will be deterred by the sight of a gun since they cannot be sure 
of winning a gun battle and the costs of losing vastly exceed the benefits of 
winning.  Let us conservatively suppose that 95 percent of attackers who do 
not have guns and 65 percent of those who do will be deterred by the victim’s 
possession and display of a gun.  Then, there would be a need to actually shoot 
at the assailant in only 13.4 percent of the times the victim is able to use the 
gun.  If the victim actually fires the gun half of these times, that implies a 
firing rate of 6.7 percent.  This in turn implies that the defender actually uses 
the gun in 217,000 violent crime defenses or 850,000 defenses, using the Kleck 
estimate of justifiable homicides. 
 
Table 551 
Violent Crime With Guns 
        
  Murders   Robberies Aggravated Agg. Ass. 
Year Murders % Guns^ Rapes* Robberies* % Guns^ Assaults* % Guns^ 
1993 24,530 69.61 106,014 659,870 42.44 1,135,607 25.29 
1994 23,330 70.02 102,220 618,950 41.60 1,113,180 24.00 
1995 21,606 68.22 97,460 618,950 41.00 1,099,180 22.90 
1996 19,645 67.79 96,252 535,594 40.70 1,037,049 22.00 
1997 18,209 67.80 96,122 497,950 39.70 1,023,492 20.00 
        
Average 21,464 68.78 99,614 586,263 41.18 1,081,702 22.91 
        
Overall Percent Guns, assuming rape at 5 percent  28.45%  
* Data from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, various years. 
^ Based on FBI data from Crime in the United States, various years. 
 
 
 51. Federal Bureau of Investigations, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 1996 
(visited Nov. 2, 1999) <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucreports.htm>; FBI National Press Office, Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 1997 (visited Nov. 2, 1999) 
<http://www.fbi.gov.pressrm/pressrel/98archives/1997rel.htm>. 
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Using the armed victim percentage of about 15 percent as derived above, 
the number of attacks from the NCVS data of 3,483,000 implies that about 
520,000 of the victims were armed at the time of the attack.  From the 
inference of 217,000 defenses, this implies a probability of being able to use a 
self-defense gun in case of being attacked of about 40 percent.  With more 
defenses, a larger number of attacks is implied. 
The total self-defense results are approximately 217,000 directly and from 
the earlier inferences on deterrence, about 350,000 other crimes reduced by 
deterrence.  This adds up to about 570,000 fewer violent crimes as the result of 
gun carrying civilians.  Of course, there may be some overlap in this count, so 
to be conservative, set it at 500,000 fewer successful violent crimes.  If Kleck 
is right, the number is closer to 2 million. 
If we were to accept the NCVS data on self-defense, some 60,000 to 80,000 
victims either attacked the offender with a gun or threatened the offender with 
a gun.52  That would imply that only 12 to 16 percent of armed victims are able 
to use their guns in self-defense.  This seems low, based on the above 
inferences which themselves seem conservative.  On the other hand, the 
estimate of 217,000 self-defenses per year with guns is below the estimates 
made by Kleck (2.0-2.5 million) and by Cook and Ludwig (1.5 million) while 
the estimate using Kleck’s measure of justifiable homicides is close to them.  
A Los Angeles Times poll found that 8 percent of the civilian population had 
ever used or displayed a gun for self-defense purposes.53  In 1994, there were 
about 195 million adults.54  With 5 percent saying “once” and 3 percent saying 
“more than once”, at least 20.4 million usages are implied.55  Prorating over 20 
years, it implies at least 1 million defensive gun uses per year.  Of course, the 
conservative assumptions made here have probably resulted in a lower 
estimate than is actually the case. 
One unknown but important factor is the extent to which the numbers of 
justifiable homicides as presented by the FBI are accurate.  Kleck, as noted 
earlier, argues that civilian legal defensive homicides using guns may be as 
few as four times the FBI count or as much as 7.4 times the FBI count.  If he is 
correct, many of these must also be in crimes not reported in the NCVS.  It 
would raise the estimate, as noted, to a figure comparable to other estimates.  It 
would also raise the deterrence effect to at least 1.4 million.  A 20 percent 
overlap of deterrence and self-defense would give an effective reduction in 
completed violent crimes of at least 2.0 million due to gun possessing and 
using civilians. 
 
 52. National Crime Victimization Survey Data Disk (1979-1987). 
 53. Table 2.67 in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1994). 
 54. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1994). 
 55. Table 2.76 in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1994). 
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5. The Crime Effect of Guns 
It would defy economic logic if people bought guns in order to improve 
their safety from crime if that improved safety were more than offset by greater 
risk from accident and theft.  In order to assert such an hypothesis, it is 
necessary to believe either that people are irrational or that they are unaware of 
the risks of owning firearms.  Accidental deaths have fallen steadily, from 
some 13 per million population to under 5 per million population in the period 
1960 to 1995.56  During this same period, gun ownership has dramatically 
increased, from 330,000 per million population to almost 900,000 per million 
population.57  This would seem either to imply that people are aware of the 
greater safety and are responding by buying more guns or they believe 
(correctly) that they can reduce the risks by proper training and appropriate 
behavior. 
It would appear that people are buying guns in response to crime in order 
to deter it or ward off attackers.  In fact, I have elsewhere (Southwick, 1997) 
reported on just that finding.58  As seen above, guns are useful in doing exactly 
that.  The crimes warded off amount to a minimum of 1,900 per million 
population and could be as many as 13,700 per million population.  A gun 
therefore appears to ward off from 0.002 to 0.015 violent crimes per year on 
the average.  Consequently, it is, reasonable for the purchaser to believe that a 
gun can be used for self-defense. 
It is also possible to look at the question directly.  If people are buying 
guns to deter crime, it should be possible to find out statistically whether guns 
are useful in doing so or whether crime is reduced when guns are increased.  
Lott and Mustard (1997)59 found this to be the case in regard to easing the laws 
on firearms ownership and carrying with consequent crime reductions, but they 
were unable to look at the effects of the number of firearms directly because 
the data needed were not collected by the responsible agencies; the agencies 
are generally forbidden by law to collect the data.  The result is that data on 
gun purchases are available only on an annual basis for the whole United 
States rather than by state. 
In order to analyze such a time series, it is appropriate to normalize the 
data in order to reduce the colinearity of the various time series.  In this 
 
 56. See Table 116 in 1984 U.S. Statistical Abstract and Table 148 in 1998 U.S. Statistical 
Abstract. 
 57. ATF Facts (Nov. 1994), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms and Communication 
from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. 
 58. Lawrence Southwick, Jr., “Do Guns Cause Crime?  Does Crime Cause Guns?  A 
Granger Test,”  ATLANTIC ECONOMIC JOURNAL, v. 23(3), 256-273 (Sept. 1997). 
 59. See particularly their conclusions, Lott, J.R. Jr. & D.B. Mustard, “Crime, Deterrence, 
and Right-To-Carry Concealed handguns,” JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, v. XXVI, 1-68 (Jan. 
1997).  Lott also found the same result using others’ coefficient estimates, Lott, J.R. Jr., “The 
Concealed Handgun Debate,” JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, v. XXVII, 221-243 (Jan. 1998) (b). 
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section, the purchases of handguns will be considered and the effects on 
changes in crime will be tested statistically.  Of course, variables will be 
normalized by population. 
The causal relation to be tested is whether the purchasing of handguns 
effects a change in the rates of the violent crimes as defined by the FBI, using 
the data collected by the FBI.  (The NCVS data are for a much shorter period).  
The data on the crimes are available from 1957 through 1996.  The Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) collects data on the numbers of guns 
sold each year of various types.60  These data are available from 1946 through 
1995.  In addition, data on population and poverty are available from various 
U.S. Statistical Abstracts. 
If handguns or other guns in civilian hands affect crime rates, it would be 
expected that the stock of guns in civilian hands has the effect rather than the 
current purchases of guns.  The former are all available for use by defenders 
and can be used to ward off criminals.  However, the actual numbers of guns 
available at any given time, the stocks, are unknown because the rates at which 
guns are destroyed are unknown and the rates at which hand-made guns are 
manufactured or guns are smuggled into the country are unknown.  The 
numbers legally purchased, however, are known with a fair degree of accuracy.  
We can, however, infer that, if the stock of guns affects the crime rate, the 
purchases of guns, which is very close to the change in the stock of guns, 
should affect the change in the crime rate.  Because the depreciation rate in the 
stock of guns is likely to be relatively constant over time, it can be ignored.  
Accordingly, the dependent variables will be the changes in the rates of the 
violent crimes.  Burglary will be added inasmuch as Lott and Mustard find that 
criminals turn to burglary when robbery becomes more difficult with the 
addition of more civilians carrying concealed firearms.61  The rates will be 
computed in terms of crimes per million population. 
The major independent variable of interest will be the rate of purchase of 
handguns.  These are the most concealable and, in the event of an attack by a 
criminal, the most readily used in self-defense.  While people do buy rifles and 
shotguns for self-defense, they are used less frequently.  From Table 1, it can 
be shown that about 81 percent of the justifiable homicides by civilians using 
guns are done with handguns.  Therefore the use of handguns is the most 
relevant if self-defense uses are proportional to the numbers of justifiable 
homicides.  The purchases of guns are in terms of handguns per thousand 
population. 
 
 60. ATF Facts, (Nov. 1994), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and 
Communications from BATF. 
 61. See Lott and Mustard (1997). 
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Other independent variables to be used include the change in the poverty 
rate62 and the change in the real per capita income level.  These are 
respectively measured as the change in the percentage poor and the change in 
terms of 1995 dollars of income per capita.  Other variables were tested but did 
not pass the test of significance to be entered in a stepwise procedure. 
Each regression is to be run using two procedures.  First, an ordinary least 
squares procedure is used.  Note that simultaneous equations is not a problem 
here because the purchase of a gun in one year is assumed to affect the change 
in crime from that year to the next.  The crime in any year may affect gun 
purchases in that year or a later year, but this is not a simultaneous effect.  The 
second regression is the same as the first but with a correction for first order 
autoregession, a frequent problem in time series regressions. 
First, look, at Table 6.  The correlations among the variables are presented, 
along with the means and standard deviations for each variable.  The violent 
crime variable is the sum of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  
Each of the crime rates is computed on a per million population basis.  The 
changes from one year to the next are also on a per million population basis as 
a result.  The quantity of handguns purchased each year is per 1000 population.  
The change in income, measured in 1995 dollars, is in dollars per capita.  The 
rate of poverty is the fraction of the population which is in poverty; the change 
is therefore also a fraction.  It will be noted that the only correlation above 0.9 
is between robbery and violent crime, both dependent variables.  Thus, there is 
expected to be no colinearity problem.  Because of missing years on certain 
variables, the data are only available for 1962 through 1995, giving 34 
observations. 
 
 62. This was cited by Handgun Control, Inc. on their web-site as an important missing 
variable in the Lott and Mustard study.  <http://www.handguncontrol.org>. 
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Table 6 
Regression Variable Correlations & Descriptions 
Years 1962-1995 
          
  )Violent )Murder )Rape )Robbery 
)Agg. 
Assault )Burglary Qh/1000Pop )Income )Poverty 
)Violent 1.0000         
)Murder 0.8662 1.0000        
)Rape 0.6931 0.6753 1.0000       
)Robbery 0.9184 0.8204 0.5335 1.0000      
)Agg. 
Assault 0.8647 0.6962 0.6679 0.5988 1.0000     
)Burglary 0.7235 0.7048 0.4879 0.8234 0.4137 1.0000    




0.0960 -0.2409 1.0000   
)Income -0.2094 -0.0907 0.0757 -0.3632 0.0136 -0.2908 -0.1573 1.0000  




0.0705 -0.0462 -0.2354 -0.1327 1.0000 
Mean 167.94 1.1490 8.437 56.84 101.51 165.65 8.3793 336.70 -0.00186 
Std. Dev. 253.76 4.8535 14.286 153.99 113.90 856.48 2.7433 367.77 0.00820 
 
The results are presented in Table 7 for the ordinary least squares.  Table 8 
shows the results corrected for first order autoregressivity.  The coefficients are 
presented along with their standard errors.  The coefficient on handgun 
purchases is significantly negative in all of the equations (only at the 10 
percent level, however, in the corrected regression for robbery) except for rape, 
where it is not significant.  A positive change in income has a significant 
negative effect on the change in robbery and burglary, but nowhere else.  A 
reduction in poverty appears to increase burglary, possibly by making targets 
more attractive, although this is not a very strong result.  Except for aggravated 
assault, there is a significant autoregressive effect.  The relative proportions of 
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the variance explained is about what would be expected, although generally 
higher than anticipated; it is usually more difficult to obtain high r2 values for 
equations explaining changes in rates than for equations explaining the rates 
themselves.  For example, the purchases of handguns and change in income 
explain almost a quarter of the change in the rate of robbery. 
 
Table 7 
OLS Regression Results 
Handgun Effects on Crime 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
      
Dependent  Purchase of Change in Change in  
Variable-Change Constant Handguns Income Poverty 
r2 
(adj.) 
      
Violent Crime 569.63* -38.326* -0.2479 -1,575 0.154 
 (145.10) (15.750) (0.1683) (7,846)  
      
Murder 8.8870* -0.74830* -0.00518 -148.62 0.178 
 (2.7370) (0.2970) (0.00317) (148.00)  
      
Robbery 294.64* -18.499* -0.27465* -5,205.9 0.249 
 (82.99) (9.006) (0.09624) (4,486.0)  
      
Rape 19.554* -1.3821 0.00143 10.160 -0.018 
 (8.964) (0.9728) (0.01040) (484.600)  
      
Aggravated Assault 246.54* -17.697* 0.03050 3,769.8 0.081 
 (67.89) (7.367) (0.07873) (3,670.0)  
      
Burglary 1,648.7* -118.88* -1.7397* -53,212* 0.347 
 (430.5) (46.72) (0.4993) (23,270)  
      
* Significant at 5 percent level, two-tail test.    
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Table 8 
AR(1) Corrected Regression Results 
Handgun Effects on Crime 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
      
Dependent  Purchase of Change in Change in  
Variable-Change Constant Handguns Income Poverty Rho 
      
Violent Crime 540.24* -36.980* -0.1853 -832.2 0.3263* 
 (165.80) (17.810) (0.1560) (7,685.0) (0.1645) 
      
Murder 8.5750* -0.74520* -0.00443 -76.756 0.4433* 
 (3.2280) (0.3436) (0.00273) (138.300) (0.1560) 
      
Robbery 279.30* -18.849^ -0.19624* -1,535.8 0.4073* 
 (97.42) (10.400) (0.08530) (4,282.0) (0.1590) 
      
Rape 13.786 -0.7632 -0.00026 -207.97 0.4728* 
 (10.770) (1.1420) (0.00884) (451.30) (0.1534) 
      
Aggravated Assault 238.89* -16.903* 0.02912 3,486.5 0.1896 
 (74.28) (8.020) (0.07741) (3,711.0) (0.1709) 
      
Burglary 1,577.2* -117.15* -1.4165* -30,669 0.5234* 
 (514.3) (54.12) (0.4005) (20,700) (0.1483) 
      
* Significant at 5 percent level, two-tail test.    
^ Significant at 10 percent level, two-tail test.    
 
It is also possible to infer aggregate effects of the stock of handguns from 
these equations as well.  This is done in Table 9.  First, the effect of the stock 
of handguns is calculated in 1995 using the BATF method which is to assume 
no depreciation of the gun stock, so the stock in 1945 is added to subsequent 
sales of handguns to obtain the total stock.63  If a depreciation rate of 2 percent 
is assumed, equivalent to a half-life of 35 years for guns, the stock would only 
be about 69 percent as large.  If a depreciation rate of 4 percent is assumed, 
equivalent to a half-life of 18 years for guns, the stock would only be about 51 
percent as large.  This would reduce the aggregate effect by 31 to 49 percent, 
 
 63. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms <http://www.atf.treas.gov>. 
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depending on the depreciation rate chosen.  Because that rate is unknown, the 




 OLS AR(1) 
       
 Per Million Total* Total# Per Million Total* Total# 
)Violent -1,435 -377,093 -738,725 -1,385 -363,849 -712,781 
)Murder -28 -7,363 -7,363 -28 -7,332 -7,332 
)Rape -52 -13,599 -18,946 -29 -7,509 -10,462 
)Robbery -693 -182,013 -362,535 -706 -185,457 -369,394 
)Agg. Assault -663 -174,122 -350,395 -633 -166,310 -334,674 
)Burglary -4,452 -1,169,671 -2,348,199 -4,387 -1,152,649 -2,314,027 
       
* Using FBI Data.      
# Using NCVS Data, except for murder.     
 
The next step is to compute the ratio of the stock in 1995 to the average 
level of purchases over the time period used in the regressions.  This was about 
37.4; there are about 37.4 times as many handguns in stock in civilian hands as 
are purchased each year.  Because the effect of the stock should be 
proportional to the effect of an increment to the stock, the aggregate effect on 
crime should be in the same proportion.  Since this is calculated on a per 
million population basis, it is necessary to multiply by the number of millions 
of population to arrive at the total effects of the handguns on crime. 
These effects are presented in Table 9 for the both the OLS equations and 
the AR(1) equations; the results differ little between the two.  As best 
estimates, violent crimes are reduced by about 370,000 per year due to the 
presence of handguns in the hands of civilians.  The main crime reductions are 
in robbery, at about 183,000, and aggravated assault, at about 170,000.  There 
are also about 7,300 fewer murders due to these handguns.  While the rape 
result is too variable to have much confidence in it, it does appear to be around 
10,000 fewer rapes each year.  Of particular interest is the 1,160,000 fewer 
burglaries each year which result from these handguns.  This is the opposite of 
the result found by Lott and Mustard who found an increase in burglary (and 
other property crimes) resulting from easing gun-carrying restrictions.64  That 
 
 64. See Lott and Mustard (1997). 
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substitution effect, however, differs from the one found here; more carrying of 
guns raises the risk to a robber but does not change the risk in the home while 
an increased number of guns raises the risk to the robber and to the burglar. 
The first results reported here are based on the FBI crime data.  The NCVS 
data, however, give estimates of crimes (other than murder) which are almost 
twice as great (see Table 2).  Using those numbers, and assuming 
proportionality, would imply that the reduction in violent crimes in the United 
States due to the ownership of handguns by civilians is about 740,000 per year; 
there are almost three-quarters of a million fewer crimes per year than there 
would be if the criminals did not have to fear the armed civilian. (See Table 9). 
The ownership of other guns, rifles and shotguns, has not been included 
because the effect was not statistically significant.  However, for protection of 
the home, as opposed to self-protection on the street, these can be effective.  
There should be some deterrence effect here as well, although it is not found in 
this study because the regressions were not run. 
6. Conclusions 
Different tests of the hypothesis that guns in the hands of civilians reduce 
crime have been tested herein.  In addition, it was attempted to quantify the 
effects.  First was a look at the rate of justifiable homicide by civilians in 
Section 2.  Using deterrence effects of executions found by others, this was 
extended to justifiable homicides.  The result was an estimate of an incentive 
effect (deterrence) of from 0.4 to 1.4 million fewer violent crimes due to 
civilian self-defense use of guns.  That included from 2,200 to 7,900 fewer 
murders per year, implying that the murder rate would have been some 10 to 
37 percent higher than it actually was had civilians not had guns for self-
defense. 
The next step, in Section 3, was a look at the probability that a victim is 
armed.  This was done by comparing the probabilities of being armed, of being 
confronted with a felon, of being able to use a gun, of shooting, of hitting the 
felon, and of killing the felon between police and civilians.  The result was that 
an expected 10 to 17 percent of civilian victims of violent crime are armed at 
the time of victimization. 
The fourth section further developed the risks to criminals from armed 
civilians.  From that, it was estimated that at least 500,000 fewer crimes 
occurred due to armed civilians.  If Kleck’s lower estimates of justified 
homicides are accepted, the numbers are much larger at more than 2,000,000.  
This is a deterrent effect; the crimes never occur. 
Finally, in the fifth section, a direct estimate of the crime reduction due to 
civilian handguns was made.  The regression run was on changes in crime rates 
as a function of handgun purchases.  The result was significant in every case 
except for rape and the estimated coefficient was negative there as well.  It was 
reasonable to infer that over 740,000 fewer violent crimes occur each year, 
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including 7,300 fewer murders, because of handgun ownership and use by 
civilians.  Again, this is a deterrent effect.  Long guns probably add to this 
effect. 
Putting together all of these results, we find that there is a good 
correspondence among them.  They are derived from different approaches, so 
that correspondence adds credibility to each method.  Somewhere around 0.8 
to 2.0 million violent crimes are deterred each year because of gun ownership 
and use by civilians.  In addition, another 1.5 to 2.5 million crimes are stopped 
by armed civilians.  There may be some overlap in these two categories 
because of the ways in which the data are collected, but there are almost 
certainly some two to four million fewer completed crimes each year as the 
result of civilian gun ownership.  Returning to Figure 1, the numbers of crimes 
“A. Deterred by Police/Courts/Corrections” are unknown.  The numbers in “B. 
Stopped by Police” are certainly quite low because police usually respond after 
the crime is completed.  The numbers in “C. Deterred by Civilians” would 
seem to be around 0.8 to 2.0 million.  The numbers in “D. Stopped by 
Civilians” are around 1.5 to 2.5 million.  Finally, the numbers in “E. 
Completed Crimes” are about 3.5 million, based on NCVS data.  Without the 
civilian guns being used to deter and stop crimes, the numbers of completed 
crimes could well double.  It would undoubtedly be the case that increased gun 
ownership would further reduce crime. 
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